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Macroeconomic Perspectives of Canada-U.S. Trade Agreements
by Carl Beigie*
I approach the Canada-U.S. relationship as an economist. I give a lot of
speeches and almost every questioner begins by saying "well, I'm not
an economist" and brags about that fact. Well, I do not apologize for
being an economist, it's an interesting perspective. There are, however,
other perspectives, which I respect. But the one that gives me the most
difficulty is the perspective of the political scientist concerned about sov-
ereignty, independence, and uniqueness as goals which have value within
a country.
My approach, after a great deal of reflection on this issue, is to argue
three things. First, uniqueness must be based on something other than
sheltered inefficiency. Second, a well-reasoned economic agreement with
the United States could improve Canada's economic performance and
thus its ability to achieve effective political sovereignty. And third, I be-
lieve the proper strategy for Canada is to pursue, simultaneously, the
following: a) improved management of the domestic economy; b) a care-
fully constructed formalization of the Canada-U.S. relationship; and c)
the pursuit of further progress through the GATT framework of multi-
lateral trade and investment liberalization.
When I was asked to speak here, it was still the case that there was
some interest in a sectoral approach to Canada-U.S. trade. However, I
have always thought that the sectoral approach, especially a sectoral ap-
proach using the AutoPact as a prototype, simply will not work politi-
cally. There is not enough time nor is there the political patience in
Washington to accommodate the deeply held fears of Canadians. Fears
that would give rise to different forms of safeguard requirements for al-
most any industry sector that you would choose to negotiate on.
In my view, Canada should pursue the bilateral approach. And in
order to succeed, the bilateral approach will require comprehensiveness.
Now, it may be possible to have differentiation in the approach, for the
transitional adjustment problems that Canada would particularly face in
a bilateral agreement. But that should be among groups of sectors-like
the competitive, nearly competitive and basket-case sectors of the Cana-
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dian economy. That is all I can see that is practical in terms of the
sectoral approach to a bilateral agreement.
That is not the focus of my remarks, it is just the starting point for
looking at the Canada-U.S. issues. I have always had a sense that
Canadians are narrow-visioned in terms of their approach to Canadian
problems in an international context. My focus concerns the
macroeconomic environment, with particular emphasis on exchange
rates and interest rates, within a broad international context. My con-
cern is that the world economy is badly out of balance. I deal with these
issues on a day-to-day basis, and the process of redressing the imbalance
that has arisen is going to take a very long time. That redressing has
probably begun, but in a manner that is going to generate mounting ten-
sions in the trade area over the next year or two.
I must first give some background for my remarks. The 1970's will
go down in economic history as the period of the Great Inflation. Imbal-
ances were created that, from an economic perspective, were strikingly
smilar to the imbalances created in the global economy during the Great
Depression. Because of this Great Inflation of the 1970's we had no al-
ternative but to provoke a recession in order to bring about a change in
the course of the world economy.
I am going to mention three elements of what I would regard as the
U.S. economic, or macroeconomic, approach under Mr. Reagan. The
first of these approaches is the monetary discipline practiced by the Fed-
eral Reserve, which provided the brake to the Great Inflation beginning
in late 1980. The second element consisted of the tax cuts, at both the
individual and corporate levels, and defense spending increases that ex-
ceeded the reductions in non-defense expenditures. The climb out of re-
cession, which was provoked by the introduction of a very tough
monetary policy, could have been extremely long and labored if some
country had not provided a strong dose of demand stimulus.
The non-inflationary growth surge, which began in late 1982 and
continued through 1984, was essential to the recovery of the global econ-
omy from the 1981-82 recession. But it was possible only through for-
eign financing of a large portion of the United States' internal budgeting
deficit. The U.S. macroeconomic strategy meant three things:
1) High inflation-adjusted interest rates-what are called real inter-
est rates. (U.S. interest rates would have been higher were it not for the
foreign funds inflow that was attracted to the United States.)
2) A very strong United States dollar, which came about as a result
of the foreign capital influence. (This was a period in which the United
States dollar won a reverse beauty contest. The economic fundamentals
in the United States were not all that glowing, but everything else was so
ugly that the United States looked relatively attractive.)
3) A very significant deterioration in the United States international
investment position. (I do not know whether it is true statistically that
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the United States became a debtor nation early in 1985, but the way
trends have been established in the trade sphere, the U.S. will definitely
be so very early 1986.)
What these developments have produced is the situation that the
United States is, has been, and will continue to be very vulnerable to a
number of factors. First it is going to be very vulnerable to higher infla-
tion when the dollar stops rising. I think the dollar has now seen its
peak; it will not go back to its previous highs again. As a result of the
dollar stopping its rise, the United States will lose the offset to inflation
that was brought about through declining prices of foreign currencies
and imports which the United States counted upon during this period.
The second vulnerability of the U.S. economy is higher interest rate
differentials. I stress the word differentials-it is not sufficient to just
look at levels in interest rates. The United States is vulnerable to a situa-
tion in which it will have to attract foreign money as soon as the dollar
loses the magnetic value which attracted foreign currencies in the past.
And the only way to induce capital inflow when the magnetism decreases
is through having interest rates higher than alternative interest rates
available to the foreign investor.
How do I know that? I live in Canada. Throughout our history, we
have constantly needed to be alert as to what our interest rates were in
relationship to alternative interest rates for the investor. When the dollar
becomes less attractive we are going to have to watch that interest rate
differential.
The third vulnerability is to the potential for a sharp fall in the U.S.
dollar when an attractive alternative emerges. I do not think gold will be
that attractive alternative. Nor do I think the yen could be that attrac-
tive alternative, because of the highly controlled Japanese financial mar-
ket. But, if one or more of the European currencies became extremely
attractive in an international financial sense, then there is potential for a
very sharp and sudden fall in the United States dollar.
The important issue at the present is whether the countries with
strengthening currencies (e.g., the mark) will be as quick to reduce their
interest rates as they were to raise them when the currencies weakened.
If the Europeans take an attitude that basically says "what we want is a
strong currency," and they pursue that instead of quickly lowering their
interest rates, then the United States will have to raise its interest rates in
order to establish a positive differential.
I will pursue this issue with a somewhat different perspective than is
commonly heard in the United States. As an economist, I have not the
slightest doubt that, in the period since late 1982, the United States did
not give, but received "aid" from the rest of the world. The real transfer
of resources, through the trade deficit which the United States was run-
ning in that period, was very substantial. (Canada contributed to this
U.S. aid, but it received aid from the rest of the world on balance. We
3
Beigie: Macroeconomic Perspectives of Canada-U.S. Trade Agreements
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1985
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
had a modest current account surplus during this period because we were
shipping capital-mainly to the United States.)
The process of restoring a better world economic balance through
non-inflationary growth would have been assisted by two things:
First, the use of the "aid" received by the United States to signifi-
cantly boost domestic investment in modern, internationally competitive
capital equipment. This is the third element of Reaganomics, an element
not very well understood in the Canadian economy. What Mr. Reagan
did more than anything else, in terms of a positive contribution to the
world economy, was to significantly increase the role of the market place
in the allocation of resources within the United States economy.
The second point that would have assisted the process to an effective
global re-balancing has not happened and in my judgment, will not hap-
pen. The United States had a serious responsibility to reduce the United
States internal budgetary deficit in line with its movement toward effec-
tive full employment. I have no objection to the fact that the United
States effectively conducted policy to receive "aid" from the rest of the
world. My objection is that the United States, and the whole fundamen-
tal logic of what Mr. Reagan was doing, required him to move quickly-
as the United States moved to a significant reduction in the unemploy-
ment rate-toward a reduction in the internal budgeting deficit. If this
had happened, then success could be measured by a future in which there
would be a slower rate of U.S. import growth.
As the United States slid down from a robust expansion after the
recession, it provided the locomotive for the rest of the world's economy.
That cannot continue forever, and what should have happened was the
United States locomotive would have slowed down and let the rest of the
train catch up with it. The United States should have slowed signifi-
cantly its rate of import growth.
If it had used that "aid" it received from the rest of the world to
effectively increase its investment potential on international competitive
terms, then the United States would have been able to have an expansion
in its exports of internationally competitive products and services. And
the combination of the slower growth in imports into the United States
with an expansion of exports, as the rest of the world increased their
growth rates, would have resulted in a much improved trade balance for
the United States and a fairly limited general depreciation of the United
States dollar. There was no reason for a large U.S. dollar depreciation if
all of these things had happened appropriately.
What would have happened under this scenario I am trying to
paint? There would have been a very steady improvement of the United
States' internal budgetary position which would have freed output in the
United States to aid the development process abroad. In other words,
after receiving the "aid" the United States would have been in a stronger
position in the late 1980's and 1990's to return the "aid." Then, a partic-
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ular economy (European or Canadian) could have undergone a fairly
substantial restructuring, resulting in modernization and enhanced com-
petitiveness. And, this would have resulted eventually in a U.S. budget-
ary surplus.
This is what has to happen eventually, before the economy of the
world is going to be back in better shape-the restoration of a strong
U.S. international investment position. The United States has no busi-
ness, in a world that is as imbalanced as ours, in being an increasingly
large net-debtor nation. This is not concerned with the protectionist ar-
guments in the United States. It is concerned with the morality of taking
from the rest of the world to improve one's own position on a steady
basis.
That is where things should have been. And I am greatly concerned
that the opportunity is going to be missed. The dollar has weakened
suddenly with the lag in foreign interest rate response-the Europeans
are going to let their currencies get much stronger before they move on
interest rates. There is a failure to cut the budgetary deficit. In the face
of rising unemployment in the United States, Congress will be much less
willing to go into a deficit cutting action if the economy is weak.
There will be a tendency to seek a lowering of interest rates in this
environment by permitting an excessive rate of money supply expansion.
This is precisely what the Federal Reserve is doing now. They are con-
cerned that if the economy softens too much, the Congressional action on
the deficit will be held off. Mr. Volker is running extremely serious risks
of increasing the money supply too rapidly and mitigating, not wiping
out, the progress that has been made around the world on reduction in
the inflation rate, which should be permanent.
Furthermore, this attempt to lower interest rates through more
rapid money supply creation will be self-defeating before very long. The
market will pick up on it quite quickly and interest rates will be rising in
the not-too-distant future. The bottom line is that missing the above
mentioned opportunity will result in a further rise in pressures for pro-
tectionism in the months and years ahead.
Thus, I would argue that the failure to follow through on the logic
of the second element of Reaganomics (temporary stimulus of the econ-
omy through tax cuts and expenditure increases) and the failure to follow
through and get the budget deficit down as the economy strengthens,
could jeopardize sustained adherence to the first principle-monetary
discipline.
Furthermore, it could lead to difficulty in terms of continued per-
formance on the third element of the Reagan program, which is, essen-
tially, increasing the flexibility and the competitiveness of the United
States' economy. If President Reagan is forced, by political reasons, to
give into Congressional pressures for protectionism, it will significantly
deprecate the whole foundation of his approach to the world economy.
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If my concerns are well-founded, we are headed for another world
economic down turn, this time led by the United States. Canada will
experience a serious weakening in its growth because of a cut back in the
major engine of that growth in recent years-exports to the United
States. This weakness will be aggravated by a tough budget coming in
the latter part of May (1985) from the current Government, which feels
it has an obligation to the business and investment community to bring a
reduction in the budgetary deficit at this time.
From a macroeconomic perspective, while the spirit of a North
American trade accord exists, the longer it takes to put forward a de-
tailed agenda for negotiation, the greater the likelihood that general
macroeconomic difficulties will sour that spirit. The comprehensive ap-
proach must be launched quickly if it's to have a chance to succeed this
century. If we wait to dot all the i's and cross all the t's, the possibility of
an agreement will lead nowhere.
Sectoral agreements are simply impractical in the environment I
foresee. Functional agreements may still be feasible as a fall-back, if we
cannot get a serious comprehensive agreement, but the longer we wait
the less meaningful those functional agreements are likely to be. I re-
spect very much the process of discussion and debate and education. I
am participating in a lot of groups such as the one at this conference.
The fact of the matter is, if we have not done our homework yet, if we
spend too much time debating what by now should be obvious, it may be
too late.
Thank you very much.
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